2026: We Need More NATO – EU To Defend Europe

In the current security situation and political climate, NATO-EU cooperation must scale up from political declarations and information sharing to effective collaboration and joint defence programs. In the next 10 to 15 years, the EU should build the conditions and capabilities to take on a more prominent role in the defence of Europe.

Defence of Europe, who is in charge?

NATO’s Article 5 collective defence guarantee has protected 30 European countries since 1949, while the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, formalised in 1993 and strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty’s 2009 solidarity clause, has evolved into a comprehensive framework aspiring toward strategic autonomy.¹ This creates a fundamental ambiguity, as both NATO and the EU claim mandates to defend Europe, yet European countries possess only a single set of forces that is currently insufficient to guarantee continental defence without U.S. contributions in command and control, intelligence, missile defence, space assets and nuclear deterrence.² While NATO allies have pledged to raise defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, the establishment of separate EU military headquarters for command and control in parallel to existing NATO structures risks absorbing a significant portion of these increased assets in duplicative planning and coordination mechanisms rather than addressing critical capability gaps.^{3, 4}

In the absence of a net distinction of roles and responsibilities of NATO and the EU on the defence of Europe, and considering the actual insufficient European military capabilities, it is an absolute imperative to reach a closer and more effective cooperation between the two organisations to achieve the maximum possible use of available resources for the defence of the European continent.^{5, 6} Failure to do so risks the inefficient dispersion of limited military assets across competing structures, as well as the possibility for strategic paralysis when a rapid and coordinated response is essential to counter emerging threats.

NATO and EU Cooperation: Progress So Far

NATO-EU cooperation has evolved over two decades, from the 2001 framework establishing consultation mechanisms and the 2003 “Berlin Plus” arrangements enabling EU use of NATO assets, to three Joint Declarations (2016, 2018, 2023) outlining collaborative actions across defence capabilities, military mobility, hybrid threats, cyber security, resilience and emerging technologies.⁷ At the strategic level, cooperation occurs through regular meetings between officials at ministerial and ambassadorial levels, though full NAC-PSC meetings have only recently resumed, while at the working level, staff-to-staff dialogue between NATO and EU institutions focuses on information sharing to avoid duplication and identify synergies.⁸ This dialogue has produced results in cyber exercises, capability planning coherence and military mobility, with the most tangible achievements at operational levels through permanent military liaison arrangements and the Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet — a rare example of genuine NATO-EU synergy where the European Defence Agency (“EDA”) initiated the programme and NATO now manages and operates the capability.⁹

However, 25 years of cooperation have produced limited progress due to persistent political and institutional tensions. The consensus rule in NATO and unanimity requirement in EU defence decisions create veto power that entrenches unresolved disputes¹⁰ including the Cyprus-Türkiye issue which remains a principal source of friction and contributes to the absence of a security agreement between NATO and the EDA.

Defence industrial policy has become another friction point, as EU instruments promoting “European preference” to reduce external dependencies clash with NATO’s transatlantic industrial integration approach, risking protectionism that could raise costs and stifle innovation.¹¹ The EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, particularly if it results in separate military headquarters parallel to NATO structures, threatens operational confusion and effectiveness. Finally, the extensive staff-to-staff dialogue has created specialised units focused on managing institutional sensitivities and procedural red lines, often constraining direct interaction among subject matter experts and limiting the substantive cooperation both organisations claim to seek.

NATO-EU Integration: The Next Steps Forward

Notwithstanding the barriers and limitations, the current security environment demands both NATO and EU to urgently focus on effective synergies for the defence of Europe, at least for the next 10-15 years and until when the EU is ready to assume a more prominent role in defence.¹²

This requires focus across three core domains: operational, capability and industrial. Focusing attention in these spaces would allow fast and tangible progresses to generate concrete practical solutions, including:

Joint European defence plan with divided responsibilities
Developing a joint overarching European Defence Plan, detailing objectives and respective roles based on the best features and structures available in the two organisations would help resolve key operations issues. As an example, while NATO could continue focusing on capability planning, air and missile defence and command and control, the EU could concentrate on resilience, mobility and civil protection.

EU capability targets and involvement in NATO planning
On capability development, the recent regulatory instruments developed by the EU, including EDIS, EDIP and Readiness 2030-SAFE, offer economic measures and financial support primarily focused on addressing the shortfalls identified through NATO defence planning process and the capability targets assigned to the European Allies. With that approach in mind, a step further would be to develop and assign specific capability targets to the EU, involving directly the EU in NATO planning.

Common Capability Development Roster
With the aim to avoid duplicative actions for the aggregation of the capability demand, the two organisations could agree on a common Capability Development Roster describing all the efforts in place and dropping any redundant projects, including on standardisation, which is traditionally centred in NATO. As a longer term measure, the current intergovernmental EDA could be replaced by an new EU Agency for Defence Capabilities, under EC-DEFIS, acting as primary interface with NATO entities for capability development cooperation and joint programmes.

Single European defence market
Fostering of the European defence industrial and technological base is an absolute necessity to overcome its current fragmentation and strengthen its competitiveness. As suggested by the Draghi report, the creation of a single defence industry market should be pursued with strong determination by the EU leaderships in order to generate the necessary economies of scale and to boost the current limited capacity in vital defence sectors.¹³

Transatlantic joint ventures and trade agreement
In parallel, the intensification of transatlantic joint ventures, based on the respective strengths of American and European industries, could be mutually reinforcing and needed in a global technological competition. However, this would require a trade agreement, likely in the framework of the Alliance, aimed at enabling technology sharing and reducing export barriers.

Final Thoughts

European policymakers face a delicate balancing act, to build credible defence capacity while strengthening transatlantic security cooperation. The progress towards a more effective NATO-EU cooperation could be severely undermined by a lack of confidence in the reliability of NATO transatlantic link, generating more incentives than ever for a full European strategic autonomy.¹⁴ So European leaders are now confronted with the double goal of strengthening the European defence while keeping the indispensable U.S. engagement. For the time being, both goals seem to be achievable through a true and constructive collaboration with NATO.

Footnotes:

1: “Brussels Declaration on Transatlantic Security and Solidarity,” NATO (July 11, 2018); “The Common Security and Defence Policy (“CSDP”),” European Parliament and “Mutual defence clause,” EUR-Lex

2: “Can Europe carry more of NATO’s burden?” The Parliament (February 3, 2026)

3: “Defence expenditures and NATO’s 5% commitment,” NATO (December 18, 2025)

4: Lindström, G. and Tardy, T. “The EU and NATO: The essential partners,” EUISS (2019)

5: Transatlantic Task Force, “Europe, NATO, and the Limits of Independence” , Commentary, Geopolitics & Great Power Politics, 6 Feb 2026

6: Joël de Bruin, “Highlight 1/2026: European strategic autonomy and dependence on NATO: Taking the middle-road,” MEIG (January 12, 2026)

7: “Relations with the European Union,” NATO (June 20, 2025)

8: “Ambassadors from the EU’s Political and Security Committee (“PSC”) and NATO’s North Atlantic Council (“NAC”) held an informal meeting on military mobility,” The Diplomatic Service of the European Union (December 22, 2025)

9: “Multinational Multi Role Tanker and Transport (“MRTT”) Fleet (“MMF”) ,” NATO

10: “Consensus decision-making at NATO,” NATO (June 30, 2023)

11: “NATO chief Rutte warns EU against defence industry ’barriers’,” NATO (January 13, 2025)

12: Patrick Keller, “The EU as NATO’s Enabler,” Internationale Politik Quarterly (February 9, 2026)

13: “The Draghi report on EU competitiveness,” European Commission (September 16, 2025)

14: Jolyon Howorth, “European Defence and NATO: From Competition to Co-operation to Replacement?” Journal Comon Market Studies (July 31, 2025)

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Published

May 20, 2026

Key Contacts

Giorgio Cioni

Senior Advisor